Maverick Philosopher

Maverick Philosopher FAQ Page and Site Introduction

Welcome to the latest incarnation of Maverick Philosopher.  This post will remain at the top of the queue to give new and some old readers an idea of what this site is and isn't, what goes on here, and what is not permitted to go on here.   Like the site itself, this introductory page is  under permanent construction and reconstruction.  It will take shape bit by bit over the coming weeks and months. 

1. Why 'Maverick Philosopher'?  Since I am a philosopher and what is done here is mainly philosophy, it is appropriate that 'philosopher' be in the title.  As for 'maverick,' this word derives from the name of the Texas lawyer Samuel Augustus Maverick (1803-1870) who for a time was a rancher who ran cattle that bore no brand. These unbranded animals of his came to be known as mavericks.  The term was then extended to cover any unbranded stock and later any person who holds himself aloof from the herd, bears no 'brand,' resists classification, strives to be independent in his thinking or mode of living, is religiously or politically unaffiliated, and the like.  (Cf. Robert Hendrickson, QPB Encyclopedia of Word and Phrase Origins, p. 473.)

The Thin Theory is Circular!

London Ed demands that I reduce my circularity objection to a sound bite.  No can do.  But at least I can combat this travesty he ascribes to me:

The thin conception of 'exists' is that 'An F exists' means the same as 'The concept *F* is instantiated'
But if *F* is instantiated, then it is instantiated by an individual that exists
Therefore the thin conception of 'exists' is circular.

So let me try once more.  I will try to be succinct.  But there is no way I can get my point across in just a few sentences.  Philosophy cannot be reduced to sound bites!

1. On the thin theory, 'An F exists' means the same as 'The concept *F* is instantiated.'
2. If a first-level concept such as *F* is instantiated, then it is instantiated by an individual.
3. Let the arbitrary constant 'a' denote an individual that instantiates *F.*

We now ask whether a exists, does not exist, both, or neither.  These are the only options.

4. By LNC, a cannot both exist and not exist.
5. By LEM, a must either exist or not exist.
6. If a does not exist, i.e., if a is a Meinongian nonexistent object, then the link expressed in (1) between existence and instantiation is broken.
Therefore
7. If  *F* is instantiated, then *F* is instantiated by an individual that exists.
Therefore
8. On the thin theory, 'An F exists' means the same as 'The concept *F* is instantiated by an individual that exists.'
9. A definition (analysis, account, theory, explanation ) is circular iff the term to be defined occurs in the defining term.
10. 'Exists' occurs both in (8)'s definiendum and its definiens.
Therefore
11. The thin theory is circular.

Summary:  Our question is: What is existence?  The thin theory maintains that existence reduces to instantiation.  The whole point of the theory is that existence is in no sense a property of individuals; what it is is a property of concepts, the property of having an instance.  But if a first-level concept is instantiated, it is instantiated by an individual that exists. Therefore, the attempt to reduce existence to instantiation ends up presupposing what was to be reduced, namely existence, and is a failed theory for this reason.

Objection.  (5) is false. Individual a neither exists nor does not exist.  To exist = to be instantiatiated, and no individual is either instantiated or not instantiated. 

Reply.  This objection begs the question.  The question is whether existence can be reduced to instantiation.  One cannot just assume that it can be so reduced.  Furthermore,it is a plain fact that individuals exist.  I exist. This cat exists.  And of course the existence of this cat is not its being instantiated.  Since I exist, and my existence is not my being instantiated, existence cannot be reduced to instantiation.

The point could be put as follows.  The thin theory tries to reduce singular existence to general existence.  But general existence presupposes singular existence: there cannot exist cats in general unless this or that individual is a cat and exists.  Therefore, singular existence cannot be reduced to general existence.

It may  that what London Ed is doing is simply stipulating that 'exist(s)' shall mean 'is instantiated.'  But an arbitrary stipulation gratuitously made can be gratuitously rejected.  That individuals exist is a plain fact, innocent until proven guilty.  The question about existence cannot be answered by any mere stipulative definition.

Robert Paul Wolff: "The Left Has Had All the Good Songs"

Anarchist philosopher Robert Paul Wolff, over at The Philosopher's Stone, writes,

While I was making dinner, Susie put on a CD of Pete Seegar [sic] songs. I was struck once again by the oft-remarked fact that for half a century, the left has had all the good songs. That cannot be irrelevant.

By the way, the old commie's name is 'Seeger' not 'Seegar.'  In the ComBox, some guy confuses him with Bob Seger! The Left has had all the good songs over the last 50 years?  Nonsense.  Here are 50 counterexamples.

The really interesting case is Bob Dylan.  The Left can of course claim the early topical songs such as Only a Pawn in Their Game and The Lonesome Death of Hattie Carroll.  (Not that we contemporary conservatives don't take on board all that was good in these critiques of racism and Jim Crow.)  But it wasn't long before Dylan distanced himself from politics and leftist ideology, a distancing documented in My Back Pages.  And then came the absurdist-existentialist-surrealist phase represented by the three mid-'sixties albums, Bring It All Back Home, Highway 61 Revisited, and Blonde on Blonde.  After that, the motorcycle accident and another attitude adjustment culminating in a couple of masterful albums, John Wesley Harding and New Morning, in which religious and conservative themes come to the fore.

I'll give just one example, Sign on a Window, from the October 1970 album, New Morning.  The song concludes:

Build me a cabin in Utah
Marry me a wife, catch  rainbow trout
Have a bunch of kids who call me 'Pa'
That must be what it's all about
That must be what it's all about.

To appreciate the full conservative flavor of this song, listen to it in the context of  "Masters of War" from the protest period and It's Alright Ma (I'm Only Bleeding) from the absurdist-existentialist-surrealist period.

Voter Identification and Voter Suppression

The controversy over voter ID is a fascinating  one because it highlights the deep divide between contemporary conservatives and contemporary liberals.  That this non-issue is debated at all shows that the Left is bereft of common sense.

Anyone with common sense ought to be able to appreciate that voting must be conducted in an orderly manner, and that only citizens who have registered to vote and have satisfied the minimal requirements of age, etc., are to be allowed into the voting booth. Given the possibility of fraud, it is therefore necessary to verify the identities of those who present themselves at the polling place. To do this, voters must be required to present a government-issued photo ID card, a driver's license being only one example of such. It is a reasonable requirement and any reasonable person should be able to see it as one.

Too many liberals, however, see these common-sense requirements as acts of voter suppression, as witness this astonishing outburst from Jennifer Granholm, former governor of Michigan:

In November, five million eligible voters will find it harder to exercise their rights in America -- 150 voter suppression laws have been introduced in 30 state legislatures across the country.

The most common tactics: requiring photo ID, restricting registration drives, limiting early voting and imposing onerous residency requirements. Who do these laws most directly affect? The poor, the elderly, minorities and the young. And how do those groups typically vote? Democratic.

Let's consider photo ID.  For Granholm, requiring such ID is a form of voter suppression.  How's that for hyperbole?  Does she call it bank withdrawal suppression when check cashers are required to produce ID?  The other day I withdrew a sum of money from a checking account in excess of what is obtainable from an ATM machine.  I was asked to show my driver's license.  Was that an infringement of my right to access my own funds?  Of course not.  The demand was eminently reasonable even though I am known at the bank in question.  Similarly with the photo ID requirement at the polling place.  Examples like this can be multiplied indefinitely.  See the above graphic.

Some liberals say that voter fraud is rare.  Maybe, maybe not.  In any case, irrelevant.  There is a principle at stake.  Besides, how many people lack ID?  Without ID one simply cannot function in society.  To exploit and adapt a slogan of the Harvard logician, Willard Quine, "No [social] entity without [social] identity."  You're a nonentity without  ID.  So when a liberal says that voter fraud is rare, reply, "So is lack of ID.  Since almost everyone has it, almost no one is excluded from voting by the ID requirement."

Since liberals don't have even one cogent argument against photo ID, we are justified in psychologizing their opposition to common-sense requirements.  Their opposition is rooted in a desire to win by any means, including fraud.  As lefties, they believe the end justifies the means.  They see themselves as the noble standard-bearers of equality against their disgusting, evil, SIXHRB opponents.  (SIXHRB: sexist, intolerant, xenophobic, homophobic, racist, bigoted. HT: Dennis Prager.)

By the way, Governor Granholm is now on the faculty at University of California, Berkeley.  Surprise! 

Companion post:  I Was Forced to Show My Papers!

Does My Front Page Take Too Long to Load?

A reader complains that my front page takes too long to load, on one of his machines, as long as five minutes.  That must be one Jurassic machine running some superannuated browser.  I am wondering if others are experiencing similar difficulties.  A while back I made some additions, including a Facebook button, and I am wondering if these add-ons are slowing things down.  The Facebook button, though, is a nifty utility: when conditions are right, the thing 'goes viral'  and I get an avalanche of page views.

I am open for comments regarding technical aspects of this site.  If, on the other hand, you have a beef about the content of these pages, then I invite you to fill out the following:

Bob Dylan Awarded Presidential Medal of Freedom

He deserves it for the hundreds of unforgettable songs ineliminable from the soundtrack of so many of our lives over the past 50 years: 1962-2012.

"Blowin' in the Wind" is the most famous of his anthems.  You may be surprised to learn that London Ed uploaded this outstanding rendition by Alanis Morissette.  Another of Dylan's great anthems is "Chimes of Freedom" here sung by the Byrds, and here by Dylan and Baez, or is it Dylan and Osbourne? (I say it's Baez)

And speaking of Baez, here she is singing Daddy, You've Been on My Mind. 

The man himself, She Belongs to Me.  I Want You.  I could go on, and on, and on.

More on C. J. F. Williams on Existence

I have been arguing with London Ed, a.k.a. 'Ockham,' about existence for years.  Here is part of  a post from the old blog dated 25 January 2006.  Ed has never said anything to budge me from my position.  So why continue?  One reason is to clarify and deepen one's understanding of one's own position.  I am also fascinated by the problem of disagreement in general.  Why do intelligent and sincere people disagree?  What can be done about it?  What does protracted disagreement say about us and our condition?

..............
     
I reject nonexistent objects in Meinong's sense. (But note well: to reject Meinongian possibilia and
impossibilia is not to reject non-epistemic possibilities and impossibilities. One can be a modal realist without being a possibilist; one can be an actualist. I am an actualist.) Given my rejection of Meinongian nonexistent objects, I cannot take negative existentials at face value.

'Frictionless planes do not exist,' for example, cannot be interpreted to be about nonexistent frictionless planes; it must be interpreted in some other way. In the language of Bertrand Russell circa 1918, one might say this: The propositional function 'x is a frictionless plane' is never true. Or one could say that the concept frictionless plane has no instances. Or: the property of being a frictionless plane is not instantiated. The point here is that the property does exist, and so is there to have a property predicated of it, the second-level property of being uninstantiated.

So I agree with Williams and 'Ockham' that there are no nonexistent objects and that apparent reference to them must be paraphrased away. There is no individual of which  we can say: it does not  exist, is not actual, is not real. But why should it follow that there  is no individual of which we can say: it exists, is actual, is real?

In my book, this is a non sequitur.

Williams assumes a sort of symmetry thesis: if there are no individuals that do not exist, then there are no individuals that exist. But my A Paradigm Theory of Existence rejects this symmetry thesis (pp. 114-116). Here is the way I put it in my book:

     If an individual exists, then no doubt it instantiates properties,
     satisfies descriptions and saturates concepts. But its existence
     cannot consist in, be identical with, its doing any of those
     things. However, if a putative individual does not exist, then its
     nonexistence can easily consist in a property's being
     uninstantiated. For a nonexistent individual is not a genuine
     individual, contra Meinong, but the mere absence of something of a
     more or less complete description. Thus there is no individual
     Pegasus to lack existence or to have nonexistence. [ . . .]

     Nonexistence is therefore always general nonexistence as opposed to
     singular nonexistence. But existence is primarily singular
     existence, the existence of individuals. Thus the asymmetry of
     existence and nonexistence. There is singular existence (the
     existence of individuals) and general existence (the
     being-instantiated of concepts) which latter presupposes singular
     existence: a first-level concept cannot be instantiated unless
     there exists an individual that instantiates it. But there is no
     such thing as singular nonexistence, e.g., the nonexistence of
     Cerberus. Thereis only general nonexistence, which is a
     second-level property.

So to Williams and 'Ockham' I say: You are right that there are no nonexistent objects. But you are wrong to infer that existence cannot  belong to individuals. It is well-nigh self-evident that existence belongs to individuals and can be predicated of them, as I do when, enacting the Cartesian cogito, I conclude, sum, 'I exist.'It is therefore a mistake to think that 'exist(s)' can only be used as a second-level predicate.

'Exist(s)' has both legitimate second-level and legitimate first-level uses.  Suppose I spy a mountain lion in my back yard.  I exclaim, 'There are mountain lions around here.'  That is a general existential sentence.  I could just as well have said, 'Mountain lions exist around here.'  The latter sentence sports a second-level use of 'exist.'  The sentence is not about any particular mountain lion even though based on the observation of a particular such critter.  Suppose I dub the distinctive cat, 'Monty.'  I can then say 'Monty exists,' and if he dies, 'Monty no longer exists.'  These latter two sentences feature first-level uses of 'exists.'

The attempt to reduce all first-level uses to second-level uses is throughly wrongheaded and impossible to carry out.  For details, see C. J. F. Williams' Analysis of 'I Might Not Have Existed.'

Existence and Quantification: Does London Ed Beg the Question?

In his latest installment, London Ed writes:

Maverick argues:

Ed thinks that the assumption that the domain of quantification is a domain of existing individuals is a contingent assumption. But I didn't say that, and it is not. It is a necessary assumption if (1) [namely that ‘Island volcanos exist’ is logically equivalent to ‘Some volcano is an island.’] and sentences of the same form are to hold. [My emphasis]

But he then says that there is nothing in the nature of logic to stop us from quantifying over nonexistent individuals, which I don't follow at all. We start with the initial logical or definition[al] assumption about the meaning of the verb 'exists'.

 (1) 'A golden mountain exists' = 'Some mountain is golden.'

[. . . ]

I suppose I need to explain why there is nothing in the nature of logic to stop us from quantifying over nonexistent individuals.  There would be something to stop us if the notion of a nonexistent object were logically self-contradictory.  But I see no contradiction in it.  So let me put the question to Ed:  Do you think that the very idea of a nonexistent object is logically self-contradictory?  If you do think this, then I refer you to my November 2009 post, Is Meinong's Theory of Objects 'Obviously Self-Contradictory'? Van Inwagen Says 'Yes.'

There is also the issue of question-begging.  Ed needs to justify the slide from

a. 'A golden mountain exists' is logically equivalent to 'Some mountain is golden'

to

1. 'A golden mountain exists' = 'Some mountain is golden.'

Equivalence is not identity!  Not even logical equivalence is identity. Propositions p, q are logically equivalent iff there is no logically possible world in which p is true and q false, or vice versa.  Now Ed and I agree about (a).  But the inference from (a) to (1) is invalid.  Consider triangularity and trilaterality.  There is no logically possible world in which it is true that something is triangular but not true that something is trilateral.  So 'Something is triangular' and 'Something is trilateral' are logically equivalent.  But it doesn't follow that they express the same proposition or that the triangularity = trilaterality.

Likewise, it does not follow from (a) that existence = someness.  Every world in which cats exist is a world in which something is a cat.  No doubt.  But how is it supposed to follow that the 'property' of existence is identical to the syntactical 'property' expressed by *Some ___ is a ---*?

Ed begs the question against me by simply stipulating that the meaning of the verb 'exists' shall be identical to the meaning of 'Some ___ is a --.'   That is what I deny.

Are You a Racist?

Find out here.

'A Pair of Pants' and Other Quirks of English

We speak of a pair of shoes, a pair of socks, a pair of gloves. But why a pair of pants? 'He bought a new pair of pants.' 'Why, does he have four legs?' A pair of socks is two things, a pair of pants one. Raising to reflective awareness these little quirks of the mother tongue is a source of pleasure to some of us.

These are pronounced similarly: cowl, fowl, howl, jowl, owl, yowl. But 'bowl' is an exception. And note that each of the following is pronounced differently: blood, food, good. Blood is good food!

These are pronounced similarly: dour, hour, our, sour; but unlike 'four' and 'pour.' And 'tour' is pronounced differently still.

Addendum 5/28:   A reader sends us here, where we read:

According to Michael Quinoin at World Wide Words, pants are a pair because, "before the days of modern tailoring, such garments, whether underwear or outerwear, were indeed made in two parts, one for each leg. The pieces were put on each leg separately and then wrapped and tied or belted at the waist (just like cowboys’ chaps). The plural usage persisted out of habit even after the garments had become physically one piece.

With a little stretching, the explanation can be made to fit 'pair of panties' despite their not having legs.

And that reminds me of the weighty question put to Bill Clinton: boxers or briefs?   Instead of replying , as he should have, that that is not a question one asks the President of the United States, Bubba answered the question in a display of what could be called anti-gravitas.  And of course thoughts of Clinton lead on quite naturally to thoughts of  Monica Lewinksy and her thongs.  'Thong' and 'G-string' are two of the species of the genus 'panties.'  Does one speak of a pair of thongs or a pair of G-strings?  Do the English speak of a pair of knickers?  If I am not mistaken knickers are what we call panties.

House and Home

You can buy a house but not a home, the blather of realtors notwithstanding.

The Cerebretonic Ectomorph

He has a lot of body surface. His 'exposure' is greater than that of the other body types. So he is more sensitive. His skin is also literally thinner, which is connected with his being psychologically 'thin-skinned.'

Misplaced Religious Enthusiasm

In our day the asceticism of old has vanished to be replaced by athletic and dietary 'asceticism' hitched to the cart of vanity.

Saturday Night at the Oldies Deferred: 50 Years of Dylan

This year we celebrate 50 years of Dylan's music.  1962-2012.  Here is a sampler.  The kid who put together this video  is to be commended for his excellent selections.  A good intro to Dylan, but it only scratches the surface of  his many-sided genius.

Teaching Versus Conducting Classes

At a gathering of Boston academicians some years back, by way of a conversational opener, I said to Professor X, "I understand you teach at the University of L." The good professor replied, "I conduct   classes at the University of L." I found that to be a very good distinction, one borne out by my own experience.

Related post: Can Philosophy be Taught?

Another Round on the Circularity of the Thin Conception of Existence

London Ed quotes me, then responds.  I counterrespond in blue.

1. ‘Island volcanos exist’ is logically equivalent to ‘Some volcano is an island.’

Agree, of course.

2. This equivalence, however, rests on the assumption that the domain of quantification is a domain of existing individuals.

Disagree profoundly. The equivalence, being logical, cannot depend on any contingent assumption. From the logical equivalence of (1), it follows that ‘the domain of quantification is a domain of existing individuals’ is equivalent to ‘some individuals are in the domain’. But the equivalence is true whether or not any individuals are in the domain. E.g. suppose that no islands are volcanoes. Then ‘Some volcano is an island’ is false. And so is ‘island volcanos exist’, by reason of the equivalence. But the equivalence stands, because it is a definition. Thus the move from (1) to (2) is a blatant non sequitur.

Ed says that the move from (1) to (2) is a non sequitur.  But the move cannot be a non sequitur since (2) is not a conclusion from (1); it is  a separate premise.  In any case, Ed thinks that (2) is false while I think it is true.  (2) is the bone of contention.  To mix metaphors in a manner most atrocious, (2) is the nervus probandi of my circularity objection.

Ed thinks that the  assumption that the domain of quantification is a domain of existing individuals is a contingent assumption.  But I didn't say that, and it is not.  It is a necessary assumption if (1) and sentences of the same form are to hold.  Let me explain.

On the thin theory, 'exist(s)' has no extra-logical content.  It disappears into the machinery of quantification.  It is just a bit of logical syntax: it means exactly what *Some ___ is a ---* means.  But quantifiers range over a domain.  In first-order logic the domain is a domain of individuals.  That is not to say that the domain cannot be empty.  It is to say that the domain, whether empty or non-empty is a domain having or lacking individuals as opposed to properties or items of some other category.

Now there is nothing in the nature of logic to stop us from quantifying over nonexistent individuals.  So suppose we have a domain populated by nonexistent individuals only.  Supppose a golden mountain is one of these individuals.  We can then say, relative to this domain, that some mountain is golden.  But surely 'Some mountain is golden' does not entail 'A golden mountain exists.'  The second sentence entails the first, but the first does not entail the second.  Therefore, they are not logically equivalent.

To enforce equivalence you must stipulate that the domain is a domain of existing individuals only.  If 'some' ranges over existing individuals, then 'Some mountain is golden' does entail 'A golden mountain exists.'   In other words, you must stipulate that the domain be such that, if there are any individuals in it, then they be existent individuals, as opposed to (Meinongian) nonexistent individuals.  The stipulation allows for empty domains; what it rules out, however, are domains the occupants of which are nonexistent individuals in Meinong's sense.

I hope it is now clear that a necessary presupposition of the truth of equivalences like (1) is that the domain of quantification be a domain of existing individuals only.  Again, such a domain may be empty.  But if it is, it is empty of existent individuals -- which is not the same as its harboring nonexistent individuals.

In other words, we can eliminate 'exist(s)' in favor of the particular quantifier 'some,' but only at a price, the price being the stipulation that quantification is over a domain of existing individuals.  But then it should be clear that the thin theory is circular.  We replace 'exist(s)' with 'some,' but then realize that the particular quantifier must range over a domain of existing individuals.  The attempt to eliminate first-level existence backfires.  For we end up presupposing the very thing that we set out to eliminate, namely, first-level existence.  The circularity is blatant.

Ed's argument against all this is incorrect.  We agree that (1), expressing as it does a logical equivalence, is necessarily true.  As such, its truth cannot be contingent upon the actual existence of any individuals.  If existence reduces to someness, then this is the case whether or not any individuals actually exist.  My point, however, was not that (1) presupposes the existence of individuals, but that it presupposes that any individuals in the the domain of quantification be existent individuals as opposed to (Meinongian) nonexistent individuals.

(1) presupposes, not that there are individuals, but that any individuals that there are be existent individuals.  If you appreciate this distinction, then you appreciate why Ed's argument fails.

Propinquity and Social Distance

Familiarity and social proximity have their positive aspects, but they also breed contempt. No man a hero to his valet. Nemo propheta acceptus est in patria sua:  No prophet is accepted in his own country. (Luke 4:24) Few bloggers are read by their relatives. Social distance, too, has positive and negative sides.  One negative is that people are more ready  to demonize and abuse the  distant than the near-by.  Internet exchanges make that abundantly evident.  On the positive side, distance breeds respect  and idealization which can taper off into idolization.

What is almost impossible to achieve is justice in our relations with others, near and far, falling into neither favoritism nor contempt, demonization nor idolization.  Four extremes to avoid if you would be just.

A. Inordinately favoring one's own; being partial; overlooking or downplaying their wrong-doing.  Tribalism. Nepotism.  Clanishness.  Chauvinism.  Racism.  Class-identification.  Blut und Boden mentality.  Example: John Gotti's children thought him a good man despite the fact that his good qualities were overshadowed by his murderous thuggishness. 

The conservative is more likely to make this mistake than the liberal.

B. Contempt for one's own; being impartial in violation of duties to kith and kin; treating them exactly as one would treat an outsider, if not better.  A vacuousness internationalism that ignores real differences.

The liberal is more likely to make this mistake than the conservative.

C. Demonization of the other, the foreigner, the stranger.  Xenophobia.  Irrational hatred of the other just because he is other.

Some conservatives are prone to this.

D. Excessive admiration of the other. Idolization of the far away. Idolatry.  Romanticization of foreign lands and cultures.

Many liberals make this mistake.

The Argument From Circularity and Singular Existential Statements: A Response

This is a response to a post of the same name by London Ed.  I am much in his debt for his copious and relentless commentary.  My responses are in blue.

After reading some of Maverick’s other posts on the subject, and reading some material he sent me, it  is clear I have misrepresented his argument. Although I am still some way from understanding it, I think it is this.

Suppose there is only one American philosopher, and suppose that it is Vallicella. Then the sentence ‘an American philosopher exists’ is true because Vallicella (qua American philosopher) exists. Now we can translate ‘an American philosopher exists’ into ‘some philosopher is American’, which reduces the verb ‘exists’ to the copula ‘is’. But we can’t translate ‘Vallicella exists’ in the same way. Thus general existential statements presuppose the truth of singular existential statements (or a disjunction or conjunction of singular existential statements). But we cannot analyse away ‘exists’ from singular existential statements. Therefore there is circularity: the same word appears on the right and left hand side of the definition. An American philosopher exists if and only if Vallicella exists.

That is not quite what I say, but it is a fair approximation.

But there is an obvious route out of this problem. What actually makes ‘some philosopher is American’ true is ‘Vallicella is an American philosopher’, which does not use the word ‘exist’. Vallicella may object that ‘Vallicella exists’ has to be true for that to work. Certainly, but we can reply in two ways. We could suppose that empty proper names are meaningless, and that ‘Vallicella’ is only meaningful because it names something. I.e. if it names something, it must name an existing something. ‘Vallicella exists’ is therefore true in virtue of the meaning of the proper name ‘Vallicella’. Or we could allow that empty proper names are meaningful, and that they have a sense but not a reference. Then we can appeal to the idea of instantiation, as with general concepts. ‘Vallicella exists’ means that the sense of ‘Vallicella’ has a referent or instance. ‘An American philosopher exists’ means that the sense of ‘American philosopher’ has an instance.

That is, either common names and proper names fall into different logical categories, in which case we don’t need to use the word ‘exists’ in singular sentences at all. Or they fall into the same category, in which case we can analyse singular existential statements exactly as we analyse general existential statements. In neither case is the definition of ‘exists’ circular.

The second alternative is available only if there are haecceity properties to serve as the Fregean senses of proper names.  Now I have argued many times in these pages and in print against such properties.  It follows that we cannot analyze 'Vallicella exists' in the same as as 'American philosophers exist.'  This leaves the first alternative, according to which the meaning of 'Vallicella' is its referent, an existing individual.  Ed claims that on this alternative "‘Vallicella exists’ is therefore true in virtue of the meaning of the proper name ‘Vallicella’."

I would say that Ed has it precisely backwards.  What he should say is that 'Vallicella' has meaning in virtue of the truth of 'Vallicella exists.'  What Ed says illustrates the linguistic idealism that I have more than once criticized him for.  V.'s existence does not depend on his name or on its meaning.  The point is clearer in terms of a non-human example.  So consider Stromboli, the island volcano.  Presumably Stromboli existed long before the emergence of language.  So what we should say is that 'Strromboli' has meaning in virtue of the fact that Stromboli extralinguistically and extramentally exists, and not vice versa.

Ed and I agree that 'Island volcanos exist' is logically equivalent to 'Some volcano is an island.'  This equivalence, however, rests on the assumption that the domain of quantification is a domain of existing individuals.  (If the domain were populated by Meinongian nonexistent objects, then the equivalence would fail.)   The attempted reduction of existence to someness is therefore circular.  For when we think it through we come to realize that the general existence expressed by sentences like 'Some volcano is an island' presupposes the  singular existence of the individuals in the domain of quantification.  This singular existence, obviously enough, precisely because it is singular, cannot be understood in terms of the logical quantity, someness.  So we move in a circle: from existence to someness and then back to existence.

The same argument can be couched in terms of instantiation.  'Island volcanos exist' is logically equivalent to the second-level predication  'The concept island volcano is instantiated.'  But if a first-level concept is instantiated, it is instaniated by at least one individual.  Obviously, this individual must exist.  (If it were a nonexistent individual, the link between existence and instantiation would be broken.)  So again we move in an explanatory circle,from existence to instantiation and back to existence again.  It follows that existence cannot be reduced to instantiation.

Pace Quine, existence is NOT what 'existential' (i.e., particular) quantification expresses.  What the particular quantifier expresses is instantiation, and instantiation is not existence. 

Elizabeth Warren's Identity Politics

A great column  by George F. Will.

Cat Blogging Friday: Alekhine and his Cat, Chess

Reuben Fine, The Psychology of the Chess Player (Dover 1967), p. 53:

In 1935, an international team tournament was held in Warsaw.  Alekhine played top board for France, of which he was a naturalized citizen.  However, on this trip he arrived at the Polish border without a passport.  When the officials asked him for his papers he replied: "I am Alekhine, chess champion of the world.  I have a cat called Chess.  I do not need papers." The matter had to be straightened out by the highest authorities.

Richard Swinburne's Obituary of C. J. F. Williams

I wasn't aware of this until now.  Williams was London Ed's teacher.  I  battle the former via the latter. 

It came as news to me that Williams spent most of his life in a wheelchair.  It testifies to the possibilities of the human spirit that great adversity for some is no impediment to achievement.  I think also of Stephen Hawking, Charles Krauthammer, and FDR.

So stop whining and be grateful for what you have. You could be in a bloody wheelchair!